It's a corollary of the "case or controversy" language In Article 3, just like ripeness, mootness, etc. In some respects, it makes a lot of sense, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D. But it's used to a large extent to decline cases the Court wishes to avoid for political reasons.
"the court rejected all the mathematical models of how to measure partisan mapfucking as being too haaaaaard"
I've read a couple of those papers, and they're only too haaaaaaard if you're a 70-year-old Jurist. Kind of like how the internet & Facebook is too hard if you're a 75-year-old Senator. I'm sure one of their twenty-something law clerks could break it down into three-syllable words for them without even trying. But they had already decided the case on political grounds.
That's what they say, but it's often used politically. Take a look at the two cases I cited and tell me whether you can see any difference between the plaintiffs in each. You can't. The difference was this: When Warth v. Seldin came up they had no idea how to deal with de facto segregation, so they didn't want to reach the merits.
The Court's standing analysis allowed them to duck it. The REAL difference was this: A year after Warth v. Seldin, the Court decided Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), holding that the de facto racial impact of the Washington state policed officers exam was OK where there was no discriminatory intent. It allowed them to address de facto racial discrimination in a context less politically charged than housing.
So when Arlington Heights came up the following year, they had figured out how to deal with de facto racial discrimination and had no trouble finding standing on virtually the same facts as in Warth v. Seldin, so they could say, "Gee, there was no discriminatory intent here, so that's just too fucking bad for black people who can't live there."
Take a look as well at Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), in which the Court engaged in some real acrobatics to find standing among an unlikely group of plaintiffs so they could reach the merits and uphold in no uncertain terms the Price Anderson Act.
If you really think the Court administers the law of standing and all the other justiciability doctrines like ripeness, mootness, Younger v. Harris, Pullman abstention, comity, and "our federalism" as legal scholars with no consideration of politics, you're missing half the fun.
Ripeness and mootness ain't in Article 3 of The Constitution, either.
In order to be a "corollary", it must be based on something that's already proven.
It's a corollary of the "case or controversy" language In Article 3, just like ripeness, mootness, etc. In some respects, it makes a lot of sense, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D. But it's used to a large extent to decline cases the Court wishes to avoid for political reasons.
I had to look this up.
Standing is NOT in The Constitution. ✓
It's based on one case from 1922.
Standing is a 100% fictional made-up concept.
https://uploads.disquscdn.c...
unpacked or uncracked
So SCOTUS ruled the plaintiffs don't have standing because each individual can only vote in one location and gerrymandering affects many locations?
https://media.giphy.com/med...
"effectless" - I think it's Scots English? Not sure.
"the court rejected all the mathematical models of how to measure partisan mapfucking as being too haaaaaard"
I've read a couple of those papers, and they're only too haaaaaaard if you're a 70-year-old Jurist. Kind of like how the internet & Facebook is too hard if you're a 75-year-old Senator. I'm sure one of their twenty-something law clerks could break it down into three-syllable words for them without even trying. But they had already decided the case on political grounds.
AOT,K
isn't she Messican?
he only bemoans Nancy O'Donnell's 'fake breasts' because she didn't let him "flubber" in them.
reminds me of that "poem" from "Welcome Back Kotter": 'My love is like a red red rose, Not a hoseUp your nose'
That's what they say, but it's often used politically. Take a look at the two cases I cited and tell me whether you can see any difference between the plaintiffs in each. You can't. The difference was this: When Warth v. Seldin came up they had no idea how to deal with de facto segregation, so they didn't want to reach the merits.
The Court's standing analysis allowed them to duck it. The REAL difference was this: A year after Warth v. Seldin, the Court decided Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), holding that the de facto racial impact of the Washington state policed officers exam was OK where there was no discriminatory intent. It allowed them to address de facto racial discrimination in a context less politically charged than housing.
So when Arlington Heights came up the following year, they had figured out how to deal with de facto racial discrimination and had no trouble finding standing on virtually the same facts as in Warth v. Seldin, so they could say, "Gee, there was no discriminatory intent here, so that's just too fucking bad for black people who can't live there."
Take a look as well at Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), in which the Court engaged in some real acrobatics to find standing among an unlikely group of plaintiffs so they could reach the merits and uphold in no uncertain terms the Price Anderson Act.
If you really think the Court administers the law of standing and all the other justiciability doctrines like ripeness, mootness, Younger v. Harris, Pullman abstention, comity, and "our federalism" as legal scholars with no consideration of politics, you're missing half the fun.
Nailed it!
THIS!
Trump? Care about any treaty let alone the1967 Outer Space Treaty.Surely you jest.
Space is bigSpace is dark Its hard to find a place to park Burmashave.
ISWYDT